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Forum Selection for International
Dispute Resolution in China-
Chinese Courts vs. CIETAC
By WILLIAM HEYE*
Introduction
Since 1993 China has been the second favored destination in the
world for foreign capital (after the United States).' Foreign
investment reached $289.4 billion in 2000.2 It is estimated that there
are in excess of 300,000 foreign-invested entities (FIEs) in China.3
The huge volume of investment in China has created a need for
reliable dispute resolution. Foreign parties want their investments to
be secure, and to this end, they seek legal certainty within a system
that will make their contracts binding and enforceable.
Article 246 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law establishes
exclusive jurisdiction for Chinese courts for all litigation involving
FIEs. This prevents foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction in
these cases! If a foreign party wants to avoid the Chinese courts by
selecting arbitration, the Chinese International Economic Arbitration
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., Brown
University. I would like to thank Professor Joel Paul for his comments and
suggestions.
1. Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249,253-54 (2001).
2. Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the
Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 59, 62 (2002).
3. Charles Kenworthey Harer, Arbitration Fails to Reduce Foreign Investors'
Risk in China, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 393, 394-96 (1999) (noting that foreign-
invested enterprises include joint ventures and wholly foreign owned Chinese
entities).
4. Civ. Proc. L. art. 246 (P.R.C.) ("Actions brought on disputes arising from the
performance of contracts for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, or Chinese-
foreign contractual joint ventures, or Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration and
development of the natural resources in the People's Republic of China shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the people's courts of the People's Republic of China.").
5. See Zhang, supra note 2, at 71.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Commission (CIETAC) is effectively the only choice for FIEs.6
Because foreign courts and foreign arbitration are not options under
Chinese law, FIEs in China must choose between CIETAC and
Chinese courts.
Most foreign parties have opted for arbitration under CIETAC.
CIETAC's reputation and popularity grew through the 1990s, peaking
in 1996 when it heard over 1,000 cases7 (at the time more than any
other arbitration body in the world).8 More recently, a number of
problems have surfaced with CIETAC. With the increasing difficulty
of enforcing CIETAC awards, the impossibility of obtaining
injunctions through arbitration, the growth of rule of law in China,
and in light of the fact that the Chinese party's assets are most likely
in China, it is time for parties doing business in China to consider
Chinese courts when drafting a forum selection agreement.
Although the Supreme People's Court has repeatedly asked all
levels of court system to treat foreign parties with the utmost fairness
and in strict accordance with existing law,9 foreign parties remain
extremely skeptical about litigating in Chinese courts. ° The popular
opinion among foreign parties doing business in China is that the
courts are not suitable for their dispute resolution needs." Said one
foreign manager, experienced in Chinese dispute resolution, "If I
have to resort to the Chinese court system, I know that I have already
lost my case."' 2
This note challenges the popular wisdom that if foreigners have
problems with their Chinese business venture, judicial options are
simply not worth pursuing.13 Until quite recently, scholarship had
tended to portray China's legal system in "excessively negative
6. Chinese International Economic Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Rules
art. 2 (3) (P.R.C.). The 1998 version of Article 2 provides much more specificity than
earlier versions about the jurisdiction of CIETAC. Ambiguous language has been
cleared up, and the most confusing question resolved: we now definitively know that
CIETAC has jurisdiction over FIEs.
7. Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 12, *5 (2000).
8. See Fredrick Brown, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the PRC, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 339 (1997).
9. Zhang, supra note 2, at 63.
10. Id.
11. James Hugo Friend, The Rocky Road Towards Rule of Law in China, 20 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 369, 379-80 (2000).
12. Roy F. Drow, Resolving Commercial Dispute in China: Foreign Firms and the
Role of Contract Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 161, 182 (1993).
13. Harer, supra note 3, at 396.
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terms, '' 14 sometimes even concluding that there is no legal system at
all. 5 But a more balanced assessment of the system, and of a foreign
party's prospects for success within it, has begun to emerge. Despite
the differences between Chinese and Western courts, and the gap
between written and practiced law in China, a satisfactory result for
the foreign party is possible in Chinese courts. As long as foreign
parties are aware of the differences and willing to tailor a strategy to
suit the system, Chinese courts may in fact be a better option for
those seeking to prevail in a dispute with a Chinese party.16
Section One of this note begins with an exploration of the
inherent problems of the enforcement division of the Chinese courts.
These problems are systemic and apply equally to court awards or
CIETAC judgments. Section Two examines the additional
enforcement problems facing CIETAC judgments. Section Three
explores criticisms of the Chinese courts and suggests some strategies
for operating effectively in this system. Finally, Section Four
compares CIETAC to Chinese courts in a few specific areas.
Ultimately the note concludes that even though courts have their
limitations, on balance they may be preferable to CIETAC arbitration.
I. Enforcement Problems in China
The weakest prong of the Chinese court system is the
enforcement apparatus. If a foreign party gets a ruling in its favor it
still must ask "[h]ow does the court make A give something to B?"' 7
"If court decisions cannot be enforced, then the rules that they
purport to implement will have little significance."" Lack of
enforcement erodes confidence in the system, and may be the biggest
problem facing the Chinese courts. 9
14. Randall Peerenboom, The X-files: Past and Present Portrayals of China's
Alien "Legal System," 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 37, 60 (2003).
15. Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 420 (2000).
16. There are, of course, a number of considerations based on a party's particular
needs, but in every situation it is important to remember that a forum selection
agreement will determine the forum whether the foreign party is the defendant or the
plaintiff.
17. Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (1996).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 28-30. There are clearly problems within the enforcement
apparatus, but finding any sort of reasonable statistic on the success rate is almost
equally problematic. The statistics do not take into account what percentage of the
2004]
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Low judicial competency is perhaps the best explanation for
problems with the enforcement apparatus. The enforcement
department ("zhixing ting") of the judiciary is generally considered to
be the worst assignment for judges. It is hard, frustrating work. It is
not intellectually challenging, and judges "on occasion have been
threatened or physically abused by angry parties that did not take
kindly to the court's attempt to enforce an award." 20 Furthermore,
"the prestige of the execution chamber is lower than that of the
adjudicatory chambers-young and capable cadres go to the
adjudicatory chambers, while the execution chamber is the refuge of
the tired, the mediocre, and the uneducated., 21 Another problem in
securing competent judges for civil enforcement actions is that the
increasingly serious problem of crime in China has geared the judicial
system towards controlling crime; the best judges and more resources
get steered towards the criminal department.22 As a result the worst
judges, or the ones with the least legal training, often end up in
enforcement.
Additional hurdles hamper even the competent enforcement
judges. What may seem like laziness or incompetence on the part of
the enforcement department may in fact be a simple lack of
motivation-often there are clumsy enforcement quotas in place and
judges may have already done their job for the year.' Or they may be
reluctant to act out of fear for their personal safety. "There are a
number of reported incidents of judges and court personnel being
threatened or beaten by the respondent's workers, shareholders, or
creditors., 24 Even when a judge wants to enforce a judgment, the
court police lack the power that regular police have.25
When the enforcement department tries to enforce an award, it
often requires cooperation outside of the judiciary. "Traditionally,
organizations outside the court bureaucracy had no more than a kind
of moral obligation to cooperate with a court., 26 In fact even within
time the winning party seeks enforcement. Clarke can only conclude that in 1992 and
1993 the defendant paid between 32% and 92% of the time-an almost meaningless
range.
20. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 294-95.
21. Clarke, supra note 17, at 3.
22. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 297-98.
23. Id. at 300.
24. Id. at 299.
25. Peerenboom, supra note 7, at *10.
26. Clarke, supra note 17, at 56.
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the traditional sphere of the court's influence, parties frequently
ignore the court's orders." So it is not surprising that courts
frequently have difficulty obtaining cooperation from other entities,
"particularly banks and other administrative agencies., 28  Donald
Clarke has gone so far as to suggest that "the court is essentially just
another bureaucracy, with no more power to tell [litigants] what to do
than the Post Office., 29 Although the court has a wide range of
contempt powers to promote payment, they remain "reluctant to
detain or even fine someone., 30 Clearly "the low stature of courts
may explain in part their reluctance to employ coercive measures.
Courts may fear that they will not be able to make good on their
threats to fine or detain officials... who do not comply with their
orders., 31  Even if the courts overcome their reluctance to issue
orders, "such orders are only pieces of paper that are dependent for
execution on the often-elusive cooperation of local officials."32
There are reports of a defendant's work unit simply refusing to
33garnish wages, or not doing so in the amount ordered by the court .
Although Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Law allows a court to
freeze funds or have them transferred to a creditor, 34 the banks may
refuse to comply with court orders, or effectively evade them. Banks
have been known to delay taking the court ordered action until "they
have had time to notify the customer and the customer could transfer
the money to another account., 35 Banks do this because they often
have loaned money to the party and therefore have a direct conflict of
interest. Although these practices are illegal,36 they continue because
banks "remain sensitive to their status and will not easily take orders
from courts, whom they perceive to be another parallel
bureaucracy., 37
27. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 296 (At times, the "Chinese respondent
brazenly ignored repeated orders by the court to attend settlement conferences ...
[and] in another case the legal representative of the Chinese company subpoenaed by
the court refused to accept service.").
28. Id. at 294.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 295.
31. Peerenboom, supra note 7, at *53.
32. Brown, supra note 8, at 341.
33. Clarke, supra note 17, at 56.
34. Id. at 72.
35. Peerenboom, supra note 7, at *49; see Clarke, supra note 17, at 73-74.
36. Enforcement Reg. art. 33 (P.R.C.).
37. Clarke, supra note 17, at 74.
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Since the court lacks power, its orders are often ignored and it is
ultimately dependent on local police for enforcement of its wishes.
Once the task is turned over to local officials, it is subject to a host of
new problems. "Law enforcement is problematic because of informal
codes and customs based on personal connections and
relationships. 3 8 For example, enforcement against military-owned
companies is not likely. A judge from the Nanning Intermediate
Level People's Court said that judgments against government or
military are generally "impossible to execute."39 Even if the party
against whom enforcement is being sought is not involved in
government, attempting to enforce judgments can still be difficult
because of local protectionism. While local bias is to some extent a
universal problem, Chinese law only exacerbates this natural home-
field advantage. 4° "Local protectionism is made worse because the
party seeking enforcement must take the application for enforcement
to the Intermediate People's Court where the 'losing' party is
domiciled or has its assets."'
1
Although there has been considerable confusion on this point
among the courts and banks of China, the losing party's home court
must often assist in the enforcement of an award. In 1983, the
Supreme People's Court and the Bank of China issued a joint notice
saying that enforcement "should" ("yingdang") be entrusted to the
local court.42 This replaced the "could" language of the 1982 Civil
Procedure Law. Then, in 1993, a new Joint Notice used the word
"may." Whatever the current status of the law is, in practice, freezing
a bank account often requires the approval of the court with
jurisdiction over the bank in question.43 In some places, banks will
"insist on an order from the local court before consenting to transfer
funds."'
Requiring the help of local courts might not be such a problem
except that the Chinese court system "suffers from rampant court-to-
38. Harer, supra note 3, at 417-18.
39. Clarke, supra note 17, at 63.
40. See Civ. Proc. L. art. 207 (P.R.C.).
41. Harer, supra note 3, at 417 n.214 (citing Alastair Crawford, Plotting Your
Dispute Resolution Strategy: From Negotiating the Dispute Resolution Clause to
Enforcement Against Assets, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC 42 (Chris Hunter ed.,
1995)).
42. Clarke, supra note 17, at 59.
43. Matthew D. Bersani, The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in China, 11 J.
INT'L ARB. 47, 49 (1992).
44. Clarke, supra note 17, at 73.
[Vol. 27:535
2004] Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China 541
court hostility. 4 5 "When an outside court goes to another area to
execute, the local court always refuses to cooperate, and may even
obstruct execution... [by having] secret communications with the
party, warning it to shift its funds and property., 46 The problem has
been repeatedly acknowledged. As early as 1991, Ren Jianxian, then-
president of the Supreme People's Court, was quoted as saying, "local
protectionism has seriously affected the judicial work of the
courts... In order to protect local interests, some courts deviated
from the principle of basing their judgment on facts... and were
partial to local parties. 47  Despite official awareness and
acknowledgement of the problem, it is difficult to correct.
Local government officials control the personnel of the courts,
and local courts remain dependent on local funding. "[J]udges are
typically drawn from the area in which they reside., 48 All judges are
selected and appointed by the Local Party Committee and operating
expenses, including the salaries of the judges, are provided from the
local government budget. 9 Often this funding comes in large part
from the party against whom enforcement is being sought. Therefore,
the court may have a direct stake in the outcome of the case.50
Beyond his own financial interest in the case, it may be hard for a
judge to ignore instructions from local government on particular
cases. "Chinese judges have no security of tenure and below the
[Supreme People's Court] are not appointed by the federal
government. Hence... judges are beholden to the county-level
government."'" "It is in the self-interest of a judge to protect local
litigants by either taking jurisdiction over such cases and issuing
rulings favorable to local litigants or refusing to enforce unfavorable
rulings rendered by other courts against local litigants.""
The Chinese courts undoubtedly have a problem with the
enforcement of their decisions. However, CIETAC judgments are
subject to these same limitations, and court systems all over the world
45. Bersani, supra note 43, at 49.
46. Clarke, supra note 17, at 44.
47. Bersani, supra note 43, at 49.
48. Margaret Y. K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese
Courts, 8 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 581, 591 (1999).
49. Zhang, supra note 2, at 94.
50. Brooke Snyder, Note, Denial of Enforcement of Chinese Arbitral Awards on
Public Policy Grounds: The View from Hong Kong, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 342
(2001).
51. Clarke, supra note 17, at 8.
52. Woo, supra note 48, at 591 (citing Clarke, supra note 17, at 49).
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suffer from this same problem. Even in the United States a large
percentage of civil judgments go unenforced. 3 So although it is a
frustrating problem, it is not one that can necessarily be avoided.
II. CIETAC Awards Suffer from Further Enforcement
Problems
A party may not avoid the Chinese courts by using CIETAC. To
have CIETAC award enforced against a Chinese party, the judgment
must be taken to a Chinese court and will suffer from all the same
enforcement difficulties outlined above. But there are additional
problems in enforcing a CIETAC judgment: the disadvantage of easy
enforcement against the foreign party in his home court; the
additional hurdle of recognition; and increased insolvency problems.
"[T]he anecdotal evidence of foreign lawyers, as well as statements
from official Chinese sources, demonstrates that foreign parties have
experienced great difficulties in enforcing... CIETAC awards.""4
The official CIETAC statistics, however, tell a different story-
claiming fewer than 5% of award recipients sought enforcement in
court and less than 8% of those were denied enforcement. 5 A 1997
study by the Arbitration Research Institute (ARI) found that 77% of
CIETAC awards were enforced.56 (But note that ARI and CIETAC
"are related both institutionally and in terms of personnel. 5 7)
Perhaps most thorough and least biased is Randall Peerenboom's
exhaustive study of forty-seven cases from 1991 to 1999. He found
that 47% of CIETAC awards were enforced at least in part by Chinese
courts. 8  But even a 1% recovery was considered a successful
enforcement for purposes of the Peerenboom study, so the
percentage of parties receiving a satisfactory amount was significantly
53. It is difficult to find reliable statistics on the subject, but in the United States,
the large amount of unenforced judgments has spawned an entire industry
specializing in recovering awards. Several recovery websites estimate that
approximately 80% of all court awarded judgments go uncollected. See Judgment
Recovery Bureau: Enforcement Overview, at
<www.judgmentrecoverybureau.bigstep.com/listofservices.html> (visited Mar. 5,
2004); see PI Consulting Group: Judgment Recovery, at
<www.thepiconsultinggroup.com> (visited Mar. 5, 2004).
54. Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT'L ARB.
89, 100 (2000).
55. Harer, supra note 3, at 397.
56. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 266.
57. Id. at 251 n.8.
58. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 254.
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Receiving an arbitral award from CIETAC is often only the first
and easiest step. If the losing party refuses to comply with the award,
the arbitration tribunal has no power to enforce its awards, and the
winning party will have to seek enforcement in Chinese courts. 9 This
is where the situation is bleakest for foreign parties, because the
winning party will seek enforcement where the losing party has assets.
In 1987 China signed the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention). As the name suggests, the convention requires courts in
contracting states to recognize written arbitration agreements and to
refuse to allow a dispute to be litigated before them when it is subject
to an arbitration agreement. It also requires courts to enforce foreign
arbitral awards.' In accordance with the New York Convention,
CIETAC awards are recognized and enforced in more than one
hundred countries, so the Chinese party will have little problem
enforcing its award in American or other foreign courts if it prevails
61in a CIETAC arbitration.
The initial excitement engendered by China's joining the New
York Convention is beginning to wane, and commentators are
realizing China's signing has "if anything disadvantaged.., foreign
firms., 62 "Enforcement of a Chinese award against a foreign party
will likely be successful in foreign courts, but the Chinese courts will
most likely refuse to enforce an award in favor of a foreign party." 63
The New York Convention is not applicable to enforcement of
Chinese arbitration in Chinese courts, as U.S. arbitration is in the
United States. "China foreclosed this possibility at the time of its
ratification of the Convention, and instead adopted a 'reciprocity'
reservation meaning that it will apply the Convention only to arbitral
awards made in the territory of other [c]ontracting states. '
Although enforcement of arbitral awards from outside China is a
59. Harer, supra note 3, at 413-14.
60. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 9 U.S.C. § 201, arts. II and III.
61. See generally Polytek Engineering Co. v. Jacobson Cos., 984 F. Supp. 1238 (D.
Minn. 1997).
62. Snyder, supra note 50, at 344.
63. Harer, supra note 3, at 395.
64. Xiaowen Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A
Comparison of the U.S. and China, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 607,615 (2000).
2004]
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problem in and of itself, 5 it is outside the scope of this paper. China's
signing of the New York Convention has essentially created a one-
way street for CIETAC decisions, where Chinese parties get the
benefit of these awards being enforced in foreign courts, but foreign
parties do not receive enforcement in Chinese courts.
Prior to 1982, there were no domestic laws at all to enforce
CIETAC awards. "Such awards were considered self-executing and
depended on voluntary compliance of the losing party. ' Presently,
domestic arbitration and civil procedure laws provide for compulsory
enforcement of arbitration awards in Chinese courts, but in practice,
the courts often reconsider CIETAC decisions before attempting to
enforce them.67 So even getting the Chinese courts to uphold the
decision can be very difficult. Officially, there are only a few grounds
for the court to deny enforcement of the award,' but often "Chinese
courts do as they please" when it comes to finding grounds for denial
of enforcement of arbitral awards, and thus awards can be
exceedingly difficult to enforce. 69 The court may set aside the
CIETAC award on its own motion, or the other party can challenge
the award by instituting an action to set aside the arbitral award.
Such an action suspends the enforcement of the award sought by the
other party until the challenge is resolved.7"
One of the legitimate grounds for denial of arbitral award
enforcement is Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law. This article
allows the courts to disallow the execution of a CIETAC award
involving a foreign party (foreign-related award) if it is contrary to
65. Andre G. Gigon, Readers Report: China: Enter at Your Own Risk, Bus.
WEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 5, available at 1997 WL 14813803 (discussing the difficulty a
French company, Tetras, S.A., had enforcing an arbitration award in China). Robert
Aronson, Chairman of RevPower Limited, described the difficulty in enforcing a $9
million award issued by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce: "When we filed the
award in the Shanghai court, the court refused to give us a receipt for the award, or a
case number, and for the next two years refused to acknowledge that the award even
existed. Brown, supra note 8, at 341-42.
66. Peerenboom, supra note 7, at *13.
67. Id. at *14.
68. See Civ. Proc. L. art. 260 (P.R.C.); Arb. L. art. 63 (P.R.C.) (These reasons for
refusal to enforce an arbitral award are consistent with the New York Convention.
Reasons to refuse the award include: if there was no binding arbitration agreement;
proper notice was absent; when the tribunal did not conform to arbitration rules; the
arbitrator conducted himself in an illegal manner; etc.).
69. Harer, supra note 3, at 121-22.
70. Li Hu, Setting Aside an Arbitral Award in the People's Republic of China, 12
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 5 (2001).
[Vol. 27:535
Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China
the social and public interest of China'.7  At first this might appear
analogous to the public policy exception outlined in the New York
Convention, but in practice the exception is interpreted much more
broadly in China.72  "[T]here is no uniform definition of public
policy... [so] [w]hat constitutes a violation ... is... decided on an ad
hoc basis. '73  CIETAC awards have been denied because of "the
economic and social consequences that would befall the local
community in the event enforcement is granted. 7 4  This is
inconsistent with the New York Convention's meaning of public
policy.7 "The scope of the public policy exception in the New York
Convention, as illuminated by its drafting history and later
interpretive case law, was intended to be very narrow., 76  China's
broad interpretation of the public policy provision allows courts
further leeway to refuse to enforce CIETAC awards.
Even if the court tries to enforce the CIETAC award, there is no
guarantee that the defendant will have funds to pay it. Randall
Peerenboom reported that insolvency was the number one reason for
failure to enforce. 7  This problem is only exacerbated with CIETAC
judgments by the fact that arbitration law does not allow for
prelitigation preservation (the emergency protection of property
before a proceeding has begun).8  Thus, a foreign party with an
arbitration agreement must first initiate a CIETAC proceeding and
ask the body to decide whether he has a valid need for property
protection, and only then can CIETAC submit the request to the
Chinese court. 9 All the time and notice involved gives the other
party an "opportunity to dispose of property that could otherwise
71. Civ. Proc. L. art. 260(2) (P.R.C.); see also Arb. L. art. 58 (P.R.C.).
72. Harer, supra note 3, at 415.
73. Hu, supra note 70, at 23.
74. Harer, supra note 3, at 415.
75. Id. at 415 n.202; Snyder, supra note 50, at 347 n.46 ("The different language
used by China-'contrary to the social and public interest of China' instead of 'public
policy' as the New York Convention uses-reflects the much broader meaning of the
term in China."); see also New York Convention art. V(2)(b).
76. Snyder, supra note 50, at 348 ("In particular, the language in the New York
Convention is narrower than that of its precursor, indicating that the drafters
intended to limit the scope of the exception."); see also Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Socidtd G6n~rale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969,
973 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 273.
78. Harer, supra note 3, at 412.
79. Arb. L. art. 68 (P.R.C.).
2004]
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satisfy an award." In contrast, the Chinese Civil Procedure Law
allows for the emergency protection of property upon the filing of an
application directly to the court, but before the initiation of a
proceeding that requires notifying the other party." So by choosing
Chinese courts, the mechanism for the emergency protection of
property works much more effectively, and the plaintiff improves its
chances of ultimately collecting.'
If the Chinese court refuses to recognize or enforce an award, the
applicant still has a valid arbitration award, which he can try to get
enforced in another location. The problem is that most Chinese
businesses do not have assets abroad that could be attached to fulfill
an award.83 Ultimately, arbitrating with CIETAC subjects the foreign
party to even more exaggerated enforcement difficulties than the
courts.
I. Chinese Courts
Despite problems with CIETAC enforcement, parties doing
business in China may pause before rushing to sign forum clauses
naming Chinese courts. Chinese courts are by no means perfect
arbiters of justice. Numerous charges have been leveled against the
Chinese court system, and many problems remain. However, the
drawbacks to Chinese courts have been exaggerated,8' and the
problems that do exist are generally surmountable. Also, the courts
continue to improve, and it quite possible that a contract signed today
might not lead to a need for dispute resolution for years, giving
further time for the courts to improve. With China's accession to the
WTO, there is little question that China is strengthening the rule of
law. 5
One of the most prominent concerns about Chinese law is the
gap between written law and law in practice. Donald Clarke, who has
80. Harer, supra note 3, at 412; see also Peerenboom, supra note 7, at 46.
81. Civ. Proc. L. art. 93 (P.R.C.); see also Peerenboom, supra note 7, at 46.
82. See Harer, supra note 3, at 412.
83. Id. at 418.
84. See Peerenboom, supra note 14, at 60-70.
85. See Lubman, supra note 15, at 423; see also Woo, supra note 48, at 583-85
(The discussion about the definition of rule of law and whether China is moving in
that direction can quickly become quite esoteric. A simple "rule of law" definition
put forward by John Rawls is: "the regular and impartial administration of public
rules." This involves the reduction of individualized discretion, leading to greater
predictability. The tension between law and discretion is present in every legal
system. It becomes a question of degree and implementation.).
[Vol. 27:535
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written extensively on the Chinese courts, says that outsiders quickly
observe that "a certain legal culture beyond the written rules is at
work."'86 And Margaret Woo points out that "[f]ormal rules.., are in
tension with the concept of individualized justice."'87 Although in
every country a gap exists between the laws on the books and actual
practice, it is widely accepted that "the distance is wider in China than
elsewhere." '8  Phillip J. McConnaughay explains: "Even though
Western insistence on the rule of law as a condition of cross-border
commerce has been met by enthusiastic acceptance and lawmaking by
policymakers, it has not occasioned the pervasive change in individual
attitudes and beliefs essential to a widespread change., 89 Although
Western-style law has been adopted in China as a prerequisite for
doing business with the West,90 there remain real questions about the
depth to which this system has penetrated and been accepted by
individual courts. Ugo Mattei places China's legal system in the
category of "traditional" law, characterized by "a high value placed
on harmony" and "a high level of discretion left to decision-
makers."9'
Part of the explanation for this gap between codified law and
practice lies in the relationship the Chinese people have historically
had with the concept of law. There are significant cultural and
historical differences between China and the West that one must
understand before examining the Chinese legal system. "By and
large, law simply was not relevant traditionally to private commercial
relationships throughout Asia."' McConnaughay points out that:
Unlike in the West, where law is bound up with ideas of deistic
origin and moral authority, the associational reference for law in
most of the Far East was imperial or despotic rulers, for whom law
served merely the instrumental purpose of imposing on the general
population arbitrary commands and duties having., little or
nothing to do with private spheres of life or commerce.
86. Clarke, supra note 17, at 81.
87. Woo, supra note 48, at 584.
88. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 307.
89. Phillip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-
West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427,479 (2001).
90. Id. at 431.
91. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 39 (1997).
92. McConnaughay, supra note 89, at 441.
93. Id. at 428-29.
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Historically in China, law has been essentially non-existent between
two individuals. It only "operated in a vertical direction from the
state upon the individual" and was often met with "overt hostility" by
the people.94  As a result, Chinese culture has historically been
adverse to "the use of law or lawsuits to resolve disputes."95 This is
seen in the ancient Chinese proverb "It is better to die of starvation
than to become a thief, it is better to be vexed to death than to bring a
lawsuit." 96
In the absence of rule of law, other values have traditionally
governed the interaction between individuals and the arrangement
and performance of private commercial affairs. Many of these ideas
stem from Confucius. A primary pillar of Confucianism is the
importance of morality. 97  "Confucian morality.., strongly
emphasize[s] maintaining social harmony through the preservation
and regulation of personal relationships."9 ' The "U" expresses the
rules of conduct involved in all relationships. These relational values
are known as "guanxi." "The primacy of relationship values...
contribute[s] ... to a significant aversion to seeking outside assistance
with the resolution of private disputes. Great shame accompanie[s]
resort to third party adjudication. ' '99
Interpersonal relationships ("guanxi") governed disputes in
China for many years and still do to a large degree today. Glenn
Butterton believes "guanxi remains central in interpersonal,
bureaucratic and commercial dealings in China today... [and] 1i...
endures as a guiding principle of Chinese social and economic life."'"
It is not surprising that the principles also manifest themselves in the
courts. Woo points out that Chinese judicial decisions "adjust future
human relationships rather than simply allocate entitlements" and
that modern Chinese judges are "social crisis managers rather than
94. Id. at 442.
95. Brown, supra note 8, at 337.
96. Kevin C. Clark, The Philosophical Underpinnings and General Workings of
Chinese Mediation Systems: What Lessons Can American Mediators Learn, 2 PEPP.
Disp. RESOL. L.J. 117, 121-22 (2002).
97. Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 52
(2001).
98. Woo, supra note 48, at 588.
99. McConnaughay, supra note 89, at 450.
100. Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1113
(1996).
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arbiters of private disputes...... One high-ranking judge said that to
"promote a unified and stable social situation is the overriding task
above all else."1°2 The President of the Shenzhen Intermediate Court
is on record as saying, "we must never pay attention only to finishing
up the case; we must at the same time pay attention to utility and
stability in society, to stabilizing relations of socialist ownership, and
to developing the socialist economy."1 3 This commonly held opinion
among judges is further evidence of the gap, since "[t]his principle is
entirely the result of party policy and is not sanctioned by any
published document with the status of law."'1°'
Although these relationship-based practices are quite alien to
Western notions of judicial impartiality and predictability, it does not
preclude success for the foreign party in Chinese courts.
McConnaughay describes the basics of the Western legal tradition:
The primacy of law.., in the governance of Western commercial
relationships is reinforced by the procedural regularity that
typically accompanies adjudicated dispute resolution.. .[S]trict
rules of judicial impartiality, transparency, procedure, and
evidentiary relevance combine for the 0 urpose and intended effect
of yielding "legally proper" outcomes.
This idea of procedural regularity and obtaining the legally proper
result is still developing in China, where there exists a tension
between predictability and the desire for a more particularized and
flexible justice. The preference for bending the rules to ensure a
harmonious outcome ("biantong"), rather than a predictable and
"legally proper" outcome, can be seen throughout the judicial system
and has led some to say "the system remains more a system of
discretion supplemented by law than a system of law supplemented
by discretion.""' There is some debate now whether China's system
should continue to be classified as a traditional law system.107
All of this does not mean that the foreign party cannot receive a
satisfactory result in the Chinese courts; it simply means that the
foreign party must employ different strategies. Randall Peerenboom
101. Woo, supra note 48, at 588.
102. Clarke, supra note 17, at 62.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 62-63.
105. McConnaughay, supra note 89, at 439.
106. Woo, supra note 48, at 615.
107. See Mattei, supra note 91, at 36-37; see also Peerenboom, supra note 14, at 45-
46.
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points out that all legal systems "are based on certain cultural beliefs
and philosophies"' 0' and that "judges everywhere approach cases with
a general sense of the issues framed by their moral views and legal
principles that on the whole are consistent with [the] moral principles
prevalent in the community. ' 1 9  Understanding such underlying
beliefs is essential to success in any foreign court. Although Chinese
courts are increasingly adopting Western legal-based standards, " '
proving that a party is legally "right" still might not be enough in a
Chinese court. A party might help itself by having a well-connected
lawyer or demonstrating a compelling social situation, such as how its
factory provides jobs in a small town. But Peerenboom points out
that the party with the best connections does not necessarily win the
case. It is only a factor. "Guanxi alone is not sufficient in all cases.""'
It can still play a role,"' however, even if its importance is decreasing.
China's legal system has adopted many aspects of a civil law
system, which tends to give judges more power than in the United
States. There are no jury trials, so the judge is always the trier of fact.
In addition, China employs the civil law inquisitorial model of
evidence-gathering under which "the court controls and shapes the
litigation by conducting active and independent inquiry." 3  As a
result, the judge is an extremely important figure in the Chinese
courts who wields a great deal of discretion and power. Many articles
have pointed out that the military background and the low
competency of Chinese judges.. have prevented judges from being
able to decide cases on their merits." The situation is changing
rapidly though. New judges are required to pass a national exam, and
former military judges are being phased out."' By the end of 1995,
108. Peerenboom, supra note 14, at 42-43.
109. Id. at 50-51.
110. Id. at 55.
111. Id. at 79-80.
112. Id. at 95 n.134 (noting that having a guanxi connection is not necessarily a
guarantee of victory. There is a broad range of results. "The results can range from
one side gaining the opportunity to present its case more fully in a private meeting
with a judge in favorable circumstances, to delaying a final adverse decision and
hence the day of reckoning, to reducing the amount of damages owed, to deciding the
case incorrectly." Id.).
113. Zhang, supra note 2, at 71.
114. See Lubman, supra note 15, at 397 (stating that in 1997 only 17 percent of
judges had any type of "college or higher academic credential.").
115. See Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and Future
Prospects, 36 INT'L LAW 1039, 1054 (2001).
116. Peerenboom, supra note 14, at 78.
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"80% of judges had at least dazhuan qualifications, which requires a
minimum of two years of college level legal training."'' 7
As a result of the individual judge's discretion, attempts to
persuade or influence the judge can be quite intense and often go
beyond persuasive speaking and presentation of evidence in the
courtroom and continue outside the court-dubbed a "backdoor
system.""' 8  This out-of-the-courtroom aspect to Chinese judicial
proceedings must be taken into account. A lawyer who understands
this and can exert such influence may be essential.
Influence can be much more subtle than a bribe-it may take
many forms such as golfing or playing mahjong and intentionally
losing."9 Woo points out:
There are... no prohibitions against ex parte contact with judges,
meaning that one party may have full access to a judge without the
other's knowledge. Consequently, ample opportunity remains for
inappropriate information to influence the judge without an
opportunity for rebuttal by the opposing side.' 20
Because there is no prohibition on ex parte contact, Chinese lawyers
still "spend much of their time trying to find easy access to the
presiding judge in lieu of traditional legal analysis.", 2' A prominent
Chinese lawyer noted that most of his colleagues prefer to bill
according to the amount at stake rather than the hour since "it was
very difficult to provide a timesheet and receipts when so much time
and money were spent on activities such as eating out and going to
Karaoke bars and saunas."1 22
Civil Procedure Law Article 44 prohibits judges from
"accept[ing] dinner invitations or gifts from the litigants or their legal
representatives." Furthermore, taking bribes, practicing favoritism,
or engaging in fraudulent behavior may subject the judge to criminal
liability."2 Corruption, however, is still acknowledged to be a serious
problem. Xiao Yang, President of the Supreme People's Court,
admitted that judges are commonly involved in such practices as
"eating free meals, taking without paying, imposing man-made
117. Id. at 82.
118. Woo, supra note 48, at 589.
119. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 304.
120. Woo, supra note 48, at 599.
121. See Zhang, supra note 2, at 94.
122. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 304 n.199.
123. Civ. Proc. L. art. 44 (P.R.C.); see also Judges Law arts. 30-32 (P.R.C.).
2004]
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barriers, and soliciting favors, demanding and taking bribes,
perverting justice for money., 124 He further acknowledges that is
getting worse every year. The Supreme People's Court reported
that fifty judges received criminal punishment for such violations in
1997.126 Although this suggests that China is actively trying to remedy
the situation, it also demonstrates that corrupt practices continue
despite the Article 44 prohibitions. 7  Although the practice may
seem strange to foreign parties, as long as it remains legal and is used
by the other side, success in Chinese courts may require attempting to
influence the judge through ex parte contact.
IV. Comparing Chinese Courts to CIETAC
A number of factors should be considered when deciding
between CIETAC and Chinese courts. An initial consideration is that
arbitration has no appeal process; an erroneous ruling cannot be
challenged. Under Chinese Civil Procedure Law, a losing party is
entitled to one appeal, but no appeal is allowed from the appellate
level. 129  Also CIETAC (and arbitration generally) cannot order
injunctive relief, whereas courts can.30  CIETAC allows a foreign
lawyer to represent the foreign party, whereas the Chinese courts
require use of a lawyer licensed in the PRC'3 Both forums allow
foreign law to be applied through choice of law provisions. 3 2 Finally,
CIETAC can be quite expensive. "Fees can range from tens of
thousands to hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars for the process.'
33
The cost is based on the amount in controversy, but this is, of course,
in addition to the standard lawyers fees. "Administrative costs for
124. Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 303 n.194.
125. Id.
126. Woo, supra note 48, at 598 n.79 (stating that this number is down from sixty-
one in 1995).
127. See Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97,113 (2003).
128. Arb. L. art. 9 (P.R.C.).
129. Civ. Proc. L. arts. 147, 158 (P.R.C.).
130. See Michael A. Hanzman, Pre-arbitration "Status Quo" Injunctions: Do They
Protect The Arbitration Process or Impair Agreements to Arbitrate?, 72 FLA. BAR J.
20, 20-21 (1998) (discussing the debate over whether injunctions are barred under the
Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4)).
131. Civ. Proc. L. art. 241 (P.R.C.); see also RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING
CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, 87-
88, (1997).
132. Civ. L. art. 145, Contract L. art. 126 (P.R.C.).
133. Harer, supra note 3, at 411.
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CIETAC are high, especially when compared to the nominal cost to
file a case in the Chinese courts., 134 Paying hefty sums for a CIETAC
judgment that is unenforceable is a hollow victory indeed. Beyond
these initial considerations, a party must consider the problematic
mediation elements that are present in both systems.
The Chinese dispute resolution system is strongly influenced by
"Confucian precepts that emphasize interpersonal relationships.. .. "
Adversarial proceedings are a last resort and indicate a "shameful
failure to settle matters amicably."'35  Between 1980 and 2000,
Chinese mediators mediated approximately 130 million civil cases,
five times the number of cases handled by the courts in the same
period.'36 This strong preference for non-judicial dispute resolution
can be seen even within the court system and CIETAC. In the courts,
"[j]udges... charged with the adjudication of disputes.., routinely
make intermittent efforts to mediate the disputes.., and they see no
particular problem with resuming their adjudicative role.' '137 This
judicial practice is codified in law,'38 but "the process of mediation has
no formalities, and is... conducted according to the judge's innate
sense of right and wrong.' ' 39  In CIETAC, "it is important to
understand that the Chinese combination of arbitration and
conciliation occurs during the ongoing process of arbitration.'" In
other words, CIETAC arbitrators can switch back and forth between
the two modes during the proceedings. Article 46 of the CIETAC
Rules stipulates that the arbitration tribunal may conciliate cases "by
any means it considers suitable." The inherent problems in this
unregulated conciliatory approach are present in both systems.
Arbitration in China has become expensive, time-consuming,
strongly biased against the foreign party, and marked by difficulty in
enforcing awards. The situation is grim, and it has increasingly forced
parties doing business in China to name Chinese courts in their forum
selection agreement. 14' This is often done in the belief that if the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 398.
136. Clark, supra note 96, at 127.
137. McConnaughay, supra note 89, at 452.
138. Civ. Proc. L. arts. 85-91 (P.R.C.).
139. Woo, supra note 48, at 597-98.
140. M. Scott Donahey, Seeking Harmony-Is the Asian Concept of the
Conciliator/Arbitrator Applicable in the West?, 50 DIsP. RESOL. J. 74, 76 (1995).
141. The total number of cases involving foreign elements has been steadily
increasing, and from 1994 to 1998 the average was 3,473 per year, while from 1998 to
2000 it increased to over 4,500 per year. Zhang, supra note 2, at 62.
20041
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
foreign party loses, it will be more difficult to attach foreign assets
with a Chinese court judgment than with a CIETAC award. 42
Enforcement of arbitration awards falls under the New York
Convention, but court awards "depend on a network of bilateral
treaties which provide poor international coverage.' ' 3 Since there is
no such treaty between the United States and China, a U.S. court is
required to consider the fairness of the practice of the particular
Chinese court. "In contrast, Chinese arbitration awards are
unconditionally enforceable."'" "The result is that foreign parties
could find it much easier to protect assets in their own country from a
Chinese court award than from an arbitration award. Foreign
investor risk may be reduced by refusing arbitration as a dispute
resolution process and forcing the dispute into court.
''141
V. Conclusion
Although a provision to litigate in Chinese court may primarily
serve to make it more difficult for the aggrieved Chinese party to
attach assets in the defendant foreign party's home country, there are
also advantages to selecting Chinese courts as the forum of choice if
the foreign party is the plaintiff. Choosing the courts may ultimately
lead to a greater chance of success (award plus enforcement) for the
foreign party as plaintiff. Although the Chinese court system differs
significantly from the U.S. system, with patience, cultural
understanding, and good local counsel, success in Chinese courts is
possible. Finally, agreeing to Chinese courts as the dispute resolution
forum might be seen as advantageous to the Chinese party and might
be used by the foreign party as a bargaining chip that could lead the
Chinese party to concede some other point in the contract. Given the
problems with CIETAC and the improvements in the Chinese courts,
a foreign party forming an FIE in China would be unwise not to
consider Chinese courts as a forum for dispute resolution.
142. Harer, supra note 3, at 398.
143. Id. at 421.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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